Biometric template protection is an emerging PETs research area that seeks to compensate for insecurities inherent This paper is a security analysis of leading privacy en-in biometric security. To protect a template, any transmitted hanced technologies (PETs) for biometrics including biomet-secret must be secured, along with the accompanying biometric fuzzy vaults (BFV) and biometric encryption (BE) The ric data. Recent work [1] has shown that recovering biometric lack of published attacks, combined with various "proven se-data from templates is possible, thus leading us to a stronger curity properties has been taken by some as a sign that these motivation for protection. The critical nature of this area leads technologies are ready for deployment. While some of the one to question the security put in place, as would be done for existing BFV and BE techniques do have "proven" security any traditional cryptographic system. Are the current offer- We also care a great deal about privacyour biometrics may be used to identify who we are, in cir-In order to motivate PETs technology, we first look at attacks cumstances where anonymity is expected. Or, even worse, against the database in a standard biometric security system. we may become the victims of identity theft if our biomet-The database is a common target of attack, and certainly a rics are compromised. The most serious flaw of biometrics, fruitful path of attack against standard biometrics. As dehowever, is non-revocability. If a biometric is compromised, picted in Figure 1 , a traditional biometric system will store the user cannot simply generate a new one, as with passwords the original templates in a database, for use in authenticaor PINs. Once a biometric is compromised, it can never be tion/identification comparisons. If an attacker can gain access recovered.
some of the theiother known attacks against BFV and BE techWork on attacks against biometric PETs is surprisingly niques. We introduce three disturbing classes of attacks against limited. Only a few papers [2] [3], [4] , defining attacks against PET techniques including attack via record multiplicity, surcurrent PETs research exist. These attacks do not span the exreptitious key-inversion attack, and novel blended substitution tent of the weaknesses in current technology. attacks. The paper ends with a discussion of the requirements In this paper, we first define four general classes of attacks for an architecture to address the privacy and security requireIn tio 2, includigtre novelaapproaces: attackv in Section 2, including three novel approaches: attack via ments.
record multiplicity (ARM), surreptitious key-inversion (SKI) attack, and new types of substitution attacks. We then present 1. INTRODUCTION an overview of the operation of BFV and BE, followed by our Biometrics, those unique traits that do not change significantly security analysis in Sections 3 and 4. By examining weakove a ifeim,pesetnteestngchalenesto the . nesses in existing systems, we will be able define the requireover' a lieie prsn.neetn hlegs scrt ments for secure biometric systems. We conclude with an researcher, because of their inherent properties. Unlike familiar cryptographic techniques, biometric data is inexact and enhanced set of requirements for PETs architectures.
can only be approximately matched, hence simple hashing 2. CLASSES OF ATTACK cannot protect it. We also care a great deal about privacyour biometrics may be used to identify who we are, in cir-In order to motivate PETs technology, we first look at attacks cumstances where anonymity is expected. Or, even worse, against the database in a standard biometric security system. we may become the victims of identity theft if our biomet-The database is a common target of attack, and certainly a rics are compromised. The most serious flaw of biometrics, fruitful path of attack against standard biometrics. As dehowever, is non-revocability. If a biometric is compromised, picted in Figure 1 , a traditional biometric system will store the user cannot simply generate a new one, as with passwords the original templates in a database, for use in authenticaor PINs. Once a biometric is compromised, it can never be tion/identification comparisons. If an attacker can gain access recovered.
to the database (despite its security measures), all template Privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) have been intro-data (X) can be compromised. duced to enhance the privacy and security of biometrics, so At the very least, encryption should be utilized to prothat they may warrant widespread adoption. Ideally, PETs tect enrolled templates in the database, with keys stored by should make use of as little personal data possible for au-a trusted third party off-site. From a privacy point of view, thentication or validation. Moreover, any personal data used function creep and owner abuse must be considered -neither should be protected in such a way that it is infeasible to reof which is reduced by standard encryption. Since decryption cover the original data or spoof the user identity.
is somewhat expensive, and needed on each match, it is likely ______________________~~~~system operators will often keep many/all records decrypted * Supported in part by NSF STTR #0II-0611283 in memory. . An attacker Unfortunately, illicit access to databases with "private" in-collects multiple enrollment templates, and is able to comformation has become commonplace, with over 150 million bine the data and at a minimum link records, and in the most financial/personnel records lost in 2006. Even with template dangerous case can retrieve the template X and the secret i encryption, using a worm or virus an attacker might get access to decrypted data in memory or intercept a key intended to un-In an Attack via Record Multiplicity (ARM), if an attacker lock an encrypted template, especially given the frequency of can harvest several of these encodings, it may be possible use. PETs systems attempt to raise the bar a step further by al-to correlate the data contained within between encodings to tering the template before storage in such a way that it cannot link the databases or, in some cases to directly retrieve X and be linked back to the user's original biometric data and such 1i ... K.n Examples are provided in Sections 3 and 4.
that matching or other operations take place in the encoded The work of [4] , discussed more in Section 3.1, could be space. We must presume that an attacker could gain access to viewed as doing a ARM analysis for one class of algorithms the database, and retrieve any data stored there.
-the community needs more of that type of work. 2.1. Attacks via Record Multiplicity 2.2. Surreptitious Key-Inversion Attack While many PETs for biometrics have attempted a formal analysis of their security, a significant oversight has been the In BFV and BE, the stated goal of the system is the release of issue of the risk from attacks that use multiple records. Since a secret key. To be useful, this key needs to be used for someto be useful biometric-based tokens need to be used in many thing, and if it leaves the vault in plin text form opens up a independent locations, they need to be non-linkable (to pro-new range of attacks Even if it only leaves in encrypted form, tect privacy) and not subject to combination. But combina-it opens up a range of insider and system-owner attacks. Figtion issues must be explicitly addressed, and are well known ure 3 shows this with encoded data F(c ) and an intercepted in standard cryptography. A classic "perfect security" model secret Kl By knowing i, an attacker can decode the biometuses a one-time pad. Its security, however, strictly depends on ric template data X by identifying values related to 3i An the single use of the pad. Some PETs depend on a random example S i presented in Section 3.
one-time pad model, and ensure the pad is used only once.
Scenarios in which an attacker can recover are not hard
But it is important to realize that in the one-time pad model, to imagine For example, if t, is an ID for user login or a the pad or data are, in a deep sense, interchangeable. In a standard cryptographic secret key, it might be possible to intraditional application of a one-time pad for cryptography, no tercept it as it is submitted or used in a further portion of an one would think of sending the same message with multiple Stolen X attacker different pads, so it is not discussed in that literature. Logi-1% cally, however, it is the same as using the same pad with many ! Briefly explained, Alice places a secret , in a fuzzy vault with or controlled by the biometric security system (i.e. the and locks it using a set A of elements from some public unioperating system), especially by an insider. Even for exter-verse U. To unlock the vault, and retrieve i, Bob must present nal attackers, traditional system attacks have exploited una set B that substantially overlaps with A. Fuzzy vaults are orprotected data transmission, unencrypted memory and virtual der invariant, meaning A and B may be arranged in any order. memory, or have utilized Trojan horse programs to intercept To protect ,, it is represented as a polynomial p, specifically data. PETs, in their most basic form, do not place any re-encoded in the coefficients. A set of points R is constructed quirements on the nature of the secret. If , is known to one from A and p(A). In addition to these points, chaff points C or more persons, it could be obtained by an attacker via so-are randomly generated and inserted into R. [5] solves the cial engineering -an attack that biometric systems are usually subset matching problem with Reed-Solomon coding. To deresilient to. Failing to consider asymmetric modes of attack code ,, if Bob's B approximately matches A, he can isolate invites trouble; determined attackers will not take the direct enough points in R that lie on p so that applying the error approach in their own security evaluations.
correcting code he can reconstruct p, and hence K.
As an example, assume Alice has chosen the polynomial 2. biometric data Xu and a secret Ku. Later, the attacker injects generated. These chaff points are added to the polynomial another set of biometric data XA and another secret KA (or Ku projection, and all of the points are shuffled randomly. If Bob if known) inplace of the user's template. The attacker's data can accurately isolate at least 3 points that lie on p, he will may be directly injected before encoding, or pre-encoded and be able to reconstruct p, and recover K encoded as (-5, 2, -1). inserted into the message before (or after) it has been accepted Without at least 3 points, Bob will not be able to recover K. into the database. The database holds only the attacker's data.
In [7] , fuzzy vaults are applied to secure fingerprint temDigitally signed templates are a partial solution.
plates. To generate the sets A and B, the x and y coordinates In the new blended substitution, the user and attacker's of fingerprint minutiae points are used. K is secured via the data are combined in a single template. If they blend using fingerprint minutiae, and can only be recovered if the minusecret Ku we call it an insidious blending as there is no way tiae set A -B. It is important to note that in this scheme, to detect it is being used. A blended template allows either the the vault is separate from any back-end application (the use user or the attacker to authenticate against the same record. In of K is decoupled from the vault) -it is only responsible for the traditional substitution case the attacker can authenticate securing K with the fingerprint data. The implementation of but simultaneously produces a denial of service to the origi- [7] creates K as a 128-bit random stream, which is analogous nal user, which increases the chance of detection. In the new to an AES symmetric key. Instead of the error correcting code blended substitution the attacker can use the records simultaof [5] , a 16-bit CRC is used for set comparison. Both the CRC neously with the user. and K bits are concatenated into a 144-bit representation, that With straight biometrics, e.g. minutiae, blended substitu-is encoded into an 8th degree polynomial. tion is not practical since a match with 50% of minutiae not Enhancements to fingerprint-based fuzzy vaults are made matching would likely be rejected. As we shall see, with bioin [8] to use minutiae location and orientation. This allows metric PETs, the privacy filter also prevents detection of the more chaff points to be included during encoding, and alblending. Even more alarming, an insidious blended attack lowing faster identification of chaff points during decoding. can be used as a back-door to biometric authentication sysFurther, a minutiae matcher is used during decoding, to imtems -by malicious parties or legitimate insiders (recall the prove the decoding process. Selecting more reliable minutiae is done by the use of local quality measures. of real data, without a matching print requires significant efThe basic idea of fingerprint fuzzy vaults to include helper fort, even considering Chang et al. [3] . data to aid in alignment was considered in [8] and [9] . AlignHowever, given two or more such BFV instances generment is a serious problem for fuzzy vault fingerprint systems.
ated from the same print, but with different keys and different A submitted image might be affected by translation, rota-random chaff, the minutiae are likely recoverable by matchtion, and non-linear distortion, causing a false-rejection dur-ing the two templates. Even with the chaff, each of minuing comparison. Helper data is used as input to alignment tiae+chaff needs to be matchable against the live minutiae. It algorithms, but must not leak any information about the minu-is possible that some chaff will randomly match. However, tiae. [8] and [9] align the query fingerprint with respect to the the error handling mechanism (CRC or ECC) is inherently template via an Iterative Closest Point algorithm.
designed to address that problem. So while one such template
In [10] a similar problem/approach for biometric authen-may be securely protected, given access to two, they can be tication is developed with some general results when the dis-easily matched and directly attacked. tribution of the original data is known and the system does We are unaware of any previous work describing attacks not leak data other than the single template + helper. In [11] , on fuzzy vaults given knowledge of the released key, i.e. a they analyzed that model and present some practical results.
SKI attack, though some might consider it obvious. If an The paper, however, lacks sufficient details to actually anaattacker is able to recover the secret i through means other lyze the security of the helper functions, or the distributions. than an attack against the template, it becomes trivial to reThe attacks presented are expected to apply to these as well.
cover the biometric data within the currently known biometric fuzzy vaults. From ,, the polynomial p is directly recon-
Previous Attacks Against Biometric Fuzzy Vaults
structed. Once p is known, R may be directly enumerated to Chang et al. [3] have investigated chaff identification, that is separate the biometric data, in the form (A, p(A)), from the in accordance with the second observation of non-randomness chaff which by design is not on the polynomial. Acidential in fuzzy vault schemes noted in [2] . The main idea of the chaff inclusion is handeled by the correction mechanism. attack is that chaff points generated later in the process tend to A blended substitution attack against BFVs is forthright. have a smallerfree area. The notion of free area refers to the Most of the vault is chaff, so the attacker can overwrite chaff amount of neighboring points in R = (X U C). A point with lines with a minutiae set (XA [ 
, encoding a smaller free area has more neighboring points than a point XA and KA. The resulting template will contain data for both with a larger free area. The authors [3] are unable to prove the legitimate user and the attacker. They could either release this analytically, but do attempt to establish it empirically. a different key (but still be associated with the record -the In [4] , Boyen takes the definitions of a fuzzy extractor backdoor approach), or with knowledge of the original key as introduced by [12] , which is theoretically an improvement can also do an insidious blending and inject their data with over [5] to leak less information. Using Dodis's definition, the true polynomial. Given the high volume of chaff used, e.g.
Boyen constructs a counterexample fuzzy extractor which is [7] has 200 chaff lines to 18 real minutiae, there is capacity to provably insecure if the same noisy secret is reused a few have many blended substitutions within one biometric fuzzy times. We categorize that work as an attack on the defini-vault. tions put forth in [12] rather than on an actual approach. They propose two security models that specifically address the case 4. BIOMETRIC ENCRYPTION of fuzzy secret reuse, respectively from an outsider and an insider perspective, in what they call a chosen perturbation Biometric Encryption (BE) [13] , is a particular approach but attack. No actual biometric fuzzy vault approaches are dis-there are, however, many related techniques which will be discussed/attacked in [4] . cussed below. Like BFVs, BE attempts to provide a way to retrieve a key using a biometric. The fundamental principle 3.2. New Attacks against Biometric Fuzzy Vaults underlying BE is correlation, with security provided by usBiometric fuzzy vaults are particularly vulnerable to ARM at-ing a random-phase correlation "pad". They provide a formal tacks, and we present a few simple examples. Consider a BFV reduction to one-time pads. At the core of the BE is a phasescheme [7] [8] with m sets of minutiae, (
, only template which is the point-wise product H,, j (u) where 0 < i < m, and where the real minutiae sets are mixed e-iAi ( e ( where Rj is the random pad used in with n lines of random chaff, (u, v, w, z). During enrollment, enrollment j of user i, and H,, j (u) is the stored template for we would assume the database would bind different keys via user i at enrollment j.
the helper data/polynomials coefficients p[i], such that given Bringing this into the realm of biometric identification and a matching print they extract the key with either using error authentication, to satisfy the aforementioned requirements, correcting codes or a separate CRC to test subsets and handle correlation is the process used to link and retrieve secret keys. a few errors. Without a matching print, the key and original Instead of returning a single scalar value indicating similarity, data are reasonably well protected since guessing the subset BE returns a 128-bit key. The function Hs is designed to 1-4244-1 549-7/07/$25.OO produce a more complex output pattern than a standard cor-as a measure during the climb. When the attacker knows the relation. During verification an input is converted into the expected result, they know the link-table constraints on the Fourier domain, point-wise multiplied by the stored mask to data and hence can construct more accurate approximations produce a result c(u). A "link table" is defined to determine of the original biometric data. output the key, by listing multiple locations from c(u) that Though it has claimed security, we show BE is susceptible when thresholded, produce either a 0 or 1. Multiple (e.g. 5) to multiple types of substitution attacks, though not quite as entries are combined for each output bit with a majority vote. simply as the straightforward manner applied to fuzzy vaults.
For enrollment, BE builds a token composed of H(u), a We have found four possible attack routes. The first presumes cryptographic key ko linked with c0 (x), and an identification that an attacker has knowledge of the key ko and a traditional code ido generated by encrypting ko and generating a one-substitution attack. Given the key the attacker simply genway hash. For verification, the token input image is used to erates an enrollment for themselves with their filter function produce cl (x), which, via the link table, generates a key kl. If HA (u), link table and ID. They can simply "add" this as a this key when used in hashing the beginning of H(y) matches new enrollment and the output identification code remains the ido, the key is released.
same, as ko has not changed. Thus it is a subsitution without
In [14] a related approach was presented for face-based denial of service and therefore less detectable. protection, except it used a MACE filter rather than standard
The blended substitution attack requires more knowledge. correlation, and it did not include the link-table component to It is easiest if attacker has knowledge of the user's biometric release the key. The security again depends on the reduction and the key (e.g. from SKI attack). In this case, the attacker to the one-time pad. Also related is [15] and other works by can craft a filter function HAU(u) that is able to generate a that group, that proposed similar threshold-based + random correlation function CAU (u) based on the user's and the atpad methods.
tacker's biometric data and a link [2] to estimate a masquerade image M and key, attack is also possible against fuzzy vaults, despite the proof which are then used as stand-ins for the known biometric/key of security presented in [5] . The first observation is that the in the above attacks. proof of security assumes the data held in the fuzzy vault With respect to ARM attacks, BE is clearly subject to corare random. When applied to biometrics, this assumed prop-relation of the templates. While they have different random erty is violated since biometric data is inherently structured. pads all user records have the same phase information for the The second observation is that chaff placement is careful, in user, so by using complex conjugates we can consider testing order to space chaff points far away from legitimate points. two templates of the same user yielding eiA-e-i ei5A-This placement scheme strays from the randomness assump-eiRk = _ iORj *iORk while for templates of different users tion. No demonstration of a successful attack, however, is we get e-iOA_ e-iORj eiOAi eiORk which does not reduce presented.
and has lower magnitude since the user and imposter have In [17] Teoh et. al. show that when the tokenized ran-different phase information. dom numbers are obtained by an attacker, the performance With respect to an ARM-based reconstruction, let us preand p rotectionof [15] , becomes unacceptable.
sume an advisory gains access to (u) for j iN. Looking at the definitions, this is simply multiple samples of 4.2. New Attacks Against Biometric Encryption the user's phase data, q5Au, corrupted by random phase noise, If the attacker knows the key, a SKI-enhanced hill-climbing i.e. a standard signal estimation problem given an accurate attack becomes possible. Adler's attack used "consistency" noise model. Despite the claims in [13] about phase-only data 1-4244-1 549-7/07/$25.OO
